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The goal of this final year project was to design, implement, and analyse the results of 
Internet traffic monitoring processes using the network of Granlund Oy as a case study. 
The main motivation behind the topic was to provide a concise analysis of the Internet traf-
fic of a medium-sized enterprise network traffic. Furthermore, the project examined the 
network traffic to find bad traffic logs that negatively affected the network performance and 
security in general.  
 
In order to get a comprehensive view of how the network resources were being used, both 
hardware and software-based monitoring devices, Bluecoat ProxySG, Bluecoat ProxyAV, 
Colasoft Capsa (free), and Snort, were used during the monitoring processes. The moni-
toring devices were set up to either intercept or mirror the traffic entering and leaving the 
network. 
 
The results of the project were the prevention of harmful traffic from entering into the net-
work, the discovery of unsolicited traffic being generated in the network by infected hosts 
and the enforcement of the company’s web access policies. These results helped in im-
proving the usage of network resources and improved network performance because the 
infected hosts were cleaned and the existing bad traffic was removed and prevented from 
entering the network at gateway level, thereby increasing overall network security. 
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1 Introduction 
Internet Traffic Monitoring (ITM) is a part of network management that has developed 
interest over the years. There are various sizes of networks everywhere and the need 
to monitor what enters and leaves the network via the Internet has increased over time 
due to the insecurity and openness of the Internet. The Internet traffic in general is not 
regulated but in some regions such as Finland, where it is regulated, the Internet Police 
(through Internet Service Providers (ISP)) have rights to access the activities of users 
during criminal investigation [2]. The freedom of internet users raises concern for com-
panies and network administrators who are supposed to be able to control their net-
work resources, especially their bandwidths. Since the Internet freedom cannot be cur-
tailed, hence the need for monitoring the activities of users. At this time, it is enough for 
network administrators to know more about the traffic passing through their networks. 
The Internet traffic is usually mirrored or intercepted and grouped into different catego-
ries using proxy servers or packet analysers. The former can either mirror or intercept 
the traffic in order to serve as a proxy, while the latter can only mirror the traffic be-
cause they are hardware and software respectively. 
 
The goal of the thesis project was to monitor the Internet traffic of Granlund Oy. 
Granlund has a medium size network with over 500 workstations (more information 
about Granlund’s network can be found in chapter 2). Each user has free access to the 
Internet and also administrative rights on their workstations. These administrative rights 
raise security concerns because it is possible for the network to be infected with net-
work worms and viruses through workstations that got infected while connected to ma-
licious sites. Also, the workstations might be used to download infected files which may 
make the network vulnerable to enterprise scale attacks. Due to these security con-
cerns, the need for monitoring became a necessity. It is important to note that Internet 
traffic monitoring and network security are complementary. In order to successfully 
secure any network, both of them have to be considered. This thesis covers Internet 
traffic monitoring extensively while also considering the security issues related to it. 
Network security will not be covered in detail but the part of it that was needed will be 
covered. 
 
Personally, my motivation for choosing this topic was due to the fact that I had the nec-
essary tools and knowledge to carry out the project. During some networking courses 
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in school such as CCNA (Cisco Certified Network Associate), I found it intriguing to see 
network packet being mirrored using Wireshark so I decided to further explore the as-
pect of traffic monitoring during my thesis project. Also, it was important to carry out a 
thesis project that was relevant to Granlund Oy since I was a trainee in the company. 
The thesis project also helped to explore the functionality of Bluecoat ProxySG and 
ProxyAV, which are devices that were acquired by the company for Internet traffic mon-
itoring purposes. 
 
2    Network Overview of Granlund Oy 
The network of Granlund is hierarchical in nature and the network was designed to suit 
the building. In general, Granlund has over 500 workstations and has over 400 em-
ployees in Helsinki and other cities in Finland and Russia. It is a service-based com-
pany, so the network is crucial to its everyday operation. Granlund specialises in build-
ing services design and also offers consultancy services on energy and environmental 
matters. Furthermore, it offers SaaS (Software as a Service) and that sector is mainte-
nance management software called RYHTI. There are quite a number of shared net-
work resources and files in Granlund and also a reliable VPN (Virtual Private Network) 
connection for remote users. The core of the network is in Helsinki and other sites are 
connected to it via MPLS (MultiProtocol Label Switching). The monitoring in this project 
was carried out in Helsinki which is the core of the network, so further network details 
will be restricted to the network of Helsinki.  
In Helsinki, the building has three floors and each floor has more than one managed 
switch (Cisco Catalyst 2960) called Floor Switches (according to the company’s nam-
ing convention) to which the workstations are connected. The floor switches are con-
nected to a central floor switch (Cisco Catalyst 3560) connected directly to the core 
level switch called the Core Switch (Cisco Catalyst 3750). The core switch is connected 
to the ISP router but there is a firewall between them to filter network traffic using pol-
icy-based routing. The firewall used is Juniper Cluster SSG 320 while Juniper SSL 
VPN is used for VPN connection authentication to the network. There is also an exter-
nal firewall (Juniper SSG 140) which controls access to the extranet. The extranet con-
tains the offered SaaS such as RYHTI. It is worth mentioning that the server LAN is 
excluded from this report. However, Granlund has over 20 servers, both virtual and 
physical. Some the servers include DNS (Domain Name Server), DC (Domain Control-
lers), VMware ESX and DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) server.  
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Figure 1 shows a concise description of the network of Granlund. Basically, it shows 
the traffic flow from the user to the Internet. There is a slight variation in the naming of 
the devices but the idea behind the internal naming convention is the same.  
Figure 1: Network overview of Granlund 
As shown in figure 1, the MPLS network connects to both the ISP router and the core. 
These connections enable the branch sites to connect to both the ISP and the core 
network in Helsinki. The connection between the MPLS and the core switch can be 
regarded as a WAN (Wide Area Network) link. The WAN connection provides remote 
connection between the sites but it is important to mention that all the traffic are routed 
through the core in Helsinki.  
3 Internet Traffic Monitoring 
 
Internet Traffic monitoring is a vital part of network management. It provides a means 
of checking network performance and diagnosing network bottlenecks when they arise. 
As the network grows, monitoring becomes necessary and at the same time complicat-
ed because the monitoring system must be set up in such a way that every branched 
traffic travelling through the core network should be monitored, so the larger the net-
work, the more complicated it is. The complexity of the network also increases with an 
increase in the traffic-generated personal devices used by the network users in an en-
terprise network. Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) is a term used to describe the free-
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dom of network users to use their own devices to connect to the network. This increas-
es the need for monitoring because it is impossible to tell which device is clean and 
which device is infected. If an infected device connects to the network, it is possible for 
it to infect other devices through network poisoning, which makes network monitoring 
both crucial and complicated.  
 
Nevertheless, there are ways through which Internet traffic monitoring could be done; it 
could be done using a hardware or a software approach [1]. The hardware and soft-
ware approaches differ in quite a few ways. One of their differences is in their respec-
tive costs. The hardware approach is much more expensive than the software ap-
proach. While the software approach only requires a dedicate network port and a work-
station, the hardware requires a dedicate port and a special hardware device used for 
monitoring, thereby increasing the cost of the later when compared to the former. An-
other difference is in their mode of monitoring. There are two types of monitoring 
modes, active monitoring and passive monitoring [12]. In active monitoring, the moni-
toring device interferes with the network to a measurable extent. Also, the device gen-
erates measurable traffic in the network. An example of the traffic generated is the in-
jection of probe packet into the network. In the passive monitoring mode, the tool does 
not interfere with the network by injecting extra network packet into it [1]. Instead, they 
act as “sniffers” that only monitor network packet transparently.   
 
Some monitoring hardware could also be used for caching web contents. Due to their 
caching possibility feature, monitoring hardware are configured to intercept the network 
traffic, so as to serve as a proxy to other devices in the network, while the software only 
mirrors the traffic passing through the network without intercepting it. An example of a 
hardware used for this purpose is Bluecoat ProxySG while both open source and li-
censed software such as TSTAT and Colasoft Capsa could be used for the software 
approach. Other aspects of ITM will be discussed subsequently. 
 
3.1 Network Performance Monitoring 
 
Network performance monitoring refers to ways through which a network’s perfor-
mance can be periodically or constantly measured to see whether it is functioning as 
expected. It is sometimes referred to as Network Performance Management. Electronic 
communication privacy laws are in place in Finland and these laws provide guidelines 
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on network monitoring. The regulatory authority is a body called “Viestintävirasto” 
(Finnish Communication Regulatory Authority). The main goal of the regulation is to 
ensure privacy and confidentiality in electronic communication. These regulations gov-
ern both users and providers of the networks. Other than for investigative purposes, 
user data should neither be accessed nor their activity history logged elsewhere (ISPs 
are allowed to log traffic for a maximum for three weeks) [2].  
 
 After setting up a network, it is important to always check its performance to ensure 
that the desired performance level is being offered. Network alarms can be set so as to 
inform the network administrator whenever there is a problem in the network or it might 
alert the network administrator whenever a threshold is reached [13]. For example, the 
threshold might be a certain level of latency or throughput allowed in the network. 
There are certain tools that can be used to monitor the performance of a network. 
Some of those tools include TSTAT, NTOP, and Capsa (Capsa will be covered in sec-
tion 4.1). There are certain parameters that are measured to determine the perfor-
mance level of a network. These parameters are called metrics [13]. There are different 
metrics which should be accounted for in network performance monitoring and they 
include network performance metrics and system performance metrics [13]. Due to the 
scope of this thesis, system performance metrics will not be covered but it is important 
to note that healthy systems or devices perform better than others in a network.  
 
Network performance metrics include channel capacity and utilization, delay and jitter, 
and packet loss and errors [3]. Channel capacity and utilization refer to the maximum 
amount of data that can be transmitted through a network channel and the actual frac-
tional capacity of the channel that was utilized during the transmission [13]. This metric 
depends on the bandwidth and the processing capacity of the medium. It is possible to 
find out whether the network is being under-utilized or over-utilized using this metric. A 
delay refers to the amount of time it takes to transmit a packet from source to destina-
tion while jitter refers to delay variation (a change in delay) over time [3]. Packet loss 
and error refer to the failure of a transmitted packet to reach its destination [13]. This 
metric is often determined by checking the amount of data retransmissions that were 
recorded by the monitoring tool. Network service performance metrics includes availa-
bility, service maintenance, and network usage [12]. Availability refers to the amount of 
time network resources are available to be used [12]. Service maintenance describes 
the ability of the network to maintain a certain quality of service. Network usage refers 
to the amount of network resource that is being used by the users of the network [12].  
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The network usage statistics enables network administrators to determine its economic 
value. For example, it is not appropriate for network users to use enterprise bandwidth 
for entertainment such as audio and video streams because these network requests 
are bandwidth consuming. Network traffic metrics include bandwidth utilization, network 
flow, dropped packet and round trip time and jitter [16]. Bandwidth utilization describes 
how much bandwidth is being consumed and the network requests which they served 
[16]. Network flow refers to a sequence of packet sent from a source to a destination 
that the source wishes to describe as a flow, for example, a media stream. Dropped 
packet refer to those data packet that could not be delivered to their destination due to 
errors. Round Trip Time (RTT) refers to the time taken by data packet to travel to their 
destination and back, while jitter refers to variations in the RTT [16]. 
 
3.2 Network Security 
 
Network security is one of the most crucial parts of network management. It is not 
enough to design and set up a well functioning network without making provision for its 
security. One characteristic of a good network is accessibility. The network must be 
accessible to its users. In order to ensure that the network is not accessed by unau-
thorised persons, security measures must be put in place to detect intrusions, and 
there must be both proactive and reactive plans ready in order to respond to attacks 
when they occur. The basic goals of network security are prevention, detection and 
response [17]. Prevention guarantees the right access to the network, detection detects 
illegal access, while response guarantees a reaction to illegal access [4]. Network se-
curity cannot be over-emphasised because it is needed to protect company and per-
sonal information on the network from unauthorised access. Also, it is needed as a 
means of authenticating users accessing the network and to guarantee the availability 
of network resources when needed. Network security is needed in every network, 
whether large or small; even home networks should be secured. The focus here will be 
on securing enterprise networks.  
 
There several ways through which the vulnerability of a network can be exploited but 
there are also counter-measures to such exploitations. Network security is usually mul-
tilayered due to the fact that no one security measure can guarantee 100% security in 
the network. The multilayered nature of the security measures makes it harder to break 
into networks because different techniques are needed to attack different security re-
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sistance. Some common network attacks are illegal access, which could be prevented 
by firewalls, network malware and Botnets, which could be detected by intrusion detec-
tion, denial of service, which could be prevented by filtering ingress traffic, TCP 
(Transmission Control Protocol) hijacking, which could be tackled by IPsec (Internet 
Protocol Security), packet sniffing, which could be prevented by packet encryption, IP 
(Internet Protocol) spoofing, which could be prevented by using secured network 
routes, and social errors, such as those from infected social networks, which could be 
minimised by educating network users. [17]  
 
Furthermore, there are also DNS (Domain Name Server) attacks, Man in the Middle 
attacks, social engineering which requires network users to reveal their login details to 
third parties, ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) attacks, Smurf attacks, and 
email spamming. There are many other ways through a network can be breached, 
hence the need for good security measures to protect the network. Firewalls are set up 
to prevent unauthorised access to networks. Firewalls can either be software-based or 
hardware-based. Most enterprises use dedicated hardware for firewalling purposes. 
Some examples of those are Juniper and Checkpoint firewalls. There are also some 
firewalls known as next generation firewalls which can also perform application control 
and intrusion detection; a good example of this is Palo Alto next generation firewall. 
Firewalls are primarily there to control both incoming and outgoing network traffic. They 
do so by enforcing certain rules set by the network administrator. For example, an en-
terprise firewall usually prevents outgoing traffic to remote locations that are not owned 
by the company.  
 
Firewalls operate by analysing network packet based on preset rules to determine 
whether or not those packets should be allowed to enter or leave the network. Firewalls 
define the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) of enterprise networks. DMZs are usually flanked 
by firewalls. One firewall is set up between the DMZ and the Internet while the other is 
set up between the DMZ and the intranet. Different sets of rules exist in both firewalls, 
with the sole purpose of controlling access to either the Internet or the intranet. Denial-
of-Service (DoS) or Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are attacks carried 
out with the aim of making network resources available to intended network users. 
DDoS is a different kind of DoS attack that targets a large number of users. These 
kinds of attacks involve sending out irrelevant packet to the network so as to over-
whelm it or prevent it from serving its purpose either temporarily or indefinitely. There 
are various forms of DoS attacks. Some of them are, for example, SYN flood attacks 
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where a flood of TCP/SYN packet are sent to a host or various hosts in the network to 
make them wait endlessly for acknowledgement packet from the sender, and Low-rate 
DoS where TCP retransmission time out (RTO) mechanism is being exploited by mak-
ing hosts on the network wait endlessly for retransmitted TCP packet. Also in this cate-
gory is ping-of-death. [17]  
 
Notwithstanding, ingress traffic filtering is a technique of used in preventing DoS at-
tacks. It does so by analysing incoming packet to verify that the sender is legit. If the 
sender cannot be verified, then the packet is discarded. Furthermore, Smurf attack is a 
common DoS attack where by the broadcast ping IP is not genuine thereby overloading 
the target network. TCP hijacking or interception is another common network attack 
that involves intercepting network packet. It can either be blind TCP hijacking or net-
work session hijacking. In the former, the TCP sequence numbers are forged by either 
guessing or using brute force and the right port to send SYN or RST flag packet which 
would disrupt network connections while in the later (also known as Man-In-the-Middle 
attack), the attacker ceases the session by becoming the middle man in the network 
thereby making clients to assume that it is the server and making the server to assume 
that it is the client. Both methods could cause network storms such as ACK and ARP 
storms in the network. [14]  
 
A workable way of preventing this is by encrypting and authenticating network packet 
using the IP Security (IPsec) protocol. IPsec is a protocol used in securing IP commu-
nication sessions by ensuring mutual authentication between agents before establish-
ing IP session connections. IPsec is one of the main features of IPV6 but it has been 
optional in IPV4. It helps to protect communication between hosts, networks and gate-
ways. Some other secure systems that are widely used are Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL), Transport Layer Security (TSL) and Secure Shell (SSH) [14]. IPsec makes it 
challenging to sniff network packet. Other forms of attacks are DNS attacks and social 
engineering. DNS spoofing (sometimes called DNS cache poisoning) is a type of attack 
that requires malicious data to be injected into the DNS server thereby rerouting traffic 
to the attacker’s computer or site [6]. This attack can also be targeted at the cache. It 
stores malicious data in the DNS cache, so that when network users make similar que-
ries or requests, the same result will be served. The sites of the attackers often contain 
executable malicious files that might harm the computers of users or introduce worms 
into the network. This type of DNS attack can be prevented by authentication through 
the use of DNS Security Extension (DNSSEC). One example of such a DNS attack 
9 
 
 
was the DNS attack of 2011 in Brazil. During the attack, the hackers gained access to 
DSLs (Digital Subscriber Line) handed out by ISPs, thereby redirecting network traffic 
by changing the primary DNS address to malicious servers thus they were able to steal 
bank login details (among other confidential information) of some users [20].  
 
Social engineering is a network attack using social tactics or error-of-judgement of the 
network users by manipulating them into divulging personal or confidential information, 
usually their login details such as usernames and password [4]. This is a form of attack 
that is proving increasingly challenging to prevent, due to the fact that network users 
might not be enlightened enough to spot suspicious requests and the attacker does not 
have to be physically present to carry out the attack. Also, it is challenging to spot such 
attacks proactively because the attacker gains access to the network or system illegally 
using valid credentials. However, the commonest form of social engineering attack is 
phishing [5]. Phishing involves the attacker (phisher) sending false emails that appear 
to be from legitimate businesses asking receivers of the emails to send their personal 
details as replies or to click on malicious verification links in order to get users to type in 
their login details on the spoofed site [5].  
 
Most enterprises often send anti-spam emails warning their network users about the 
existence and circulation of such emails known as spams [5]. Educating network or 
system users and creating awareness has been one of the most effective ways of pre-
venting such attacks and also having a proactive plan in place in case suspicions of 
such attacks are reported. Furthermore, the organization’s security policy should be 
stressed during orientation. For example, the roles of the technical support team should 
be well documented so that attackers who make phone calls posing to be technical 
support can be easily detected when they ask for sensitive information that should not 
be revealed to any other person. Also, if the user reveals such details, the technical 
team should be contacted immediately to curtail the attack by maybe disabling that 
particular account. Considering all these possible attacks and countermeasures, it is 
necessary to have a system that monitors network activities to detect intrusions. This 
type of system is called Intrusion Detection and Prevention System. 
 
3.3 Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) 
 
Intrusion detection is described as the process of monitoring events in a system or 
network so as to detect violations to acceptable standards and policies. The IDP (Intru-
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sion Detection and Prevention) is usually carried out by a device or software. It detects 
abnormal activities (whether malicious or not), alerts the security administrator or pre-
vents the activity from execution. These activities could be malware such as worms, 
spywares, and Trojans, attackers gaining or attempting to gain unauthorised access, 
and mistakes done by authorised users that raise suspicions for example, trying out 
remote access to other workstations or servers. [7] 
 
There are two main forms of intrusion detection, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and 
Intrusion Prevention Systems. The main difference is that the IPS is able to prevent 
intrusions when detected, while the IDS cannot prevent intrusion. IDS are designed to 
monitor intrusions, while IPS focuses on identifying and blocking intrusion threats. In 
this report, the term IDPS will be used to refer to both because the IPS is simply an 
extension of the IDS [7]. IDPS are mainly used to identify and prevent unwanted inci-
dents by using certain security thresholds set by the security administrator. IDPS can 
also be used to ensure compliance to enterprise security policies and to log detected 
threats and attempts. These functions have made it necessary for organizations to 
have an IDPS. IDPS technologies perform three main functions: recording and logging 
observed events, notifying administrators about observed events (this is also known as 
alerts), and reporting [15]. The reporting might be done by some other reporting soft-
ware from the logs collected.  
 
Furthermore, the prevention system also stops the attacks detected, changes the con-
tent of the attack by filling files with harmless messages and by making changes to the 
security environment if granted that right. IDPS technologies use at least one of these 
three detection techniques: signature-based, anomaly-based, and stateful protocol [7]. 
Multiple techniques are usually used to attain a high level of attack detection because 
lone techniques might prove insufficient. Signature-based detection is the simplest form 
of detection and it involves monitoring and comparing network packet with known at-
tack patterns known as signatures. An example of a signature is a suspicious file name 
that ends with “exe” (freewallpaper.exe). Signature-based detection uses 
string/character comparison to detect anomaly so any change in the threat name will 
bypass this technique. For example, if the initial file name (freewallpaper.exe) was re-
named to be free1wallpaper.exe, it will not be detected by this technique. Also, this 
technique lacks the ability to recall previous requests when processing current re-
quests.  
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The limitations described above necessitated the need for another or additional tech-
nique. Anomaly-based detection was developed to complement the weaknesses of the 
signature-based technique [7]. This detection method detects attacks by detecting net-
work anomalies. The detection system observes normal patterns in the network, such 
as bandwidth usage, common protocols used, and devices that often connect to each 
other; so whenever any activity that is unusual occurs in the network, the detection 
system detects it and alerts the administrator. For an IDPS that uses this technique to 
function, network profiles describing normal activities in the network should be created, 
so as to enable the system to compare network activities with predefined network pro-
files or rules [15]. The challenge with this system is accuracy, frequency, and dyna-
mism of the network profiles. The profiles are usually generated by the system during 
the training period when the IDS is being tested and is not monitoring intrusion. After 
generating the profiles, accuracy cannot be guaranteed because a malicious process 
might be considered safe and the frequency of the profile generation comes into ques-
tion.  
 
There are two types of profiles generated: static and dynamic profiles [7]. Static profiles 
are those that remain unchanged when an anomaly is detected, while dynamic profiles 
are those that are changed when anomaly is detected [7]. Generated profiles should be 
generated over a period of time ranging from hours to months and they should be able 
to cope with false positives. False positives are observed events that are categorised 
as malicious when they are not, while false negatives are observed events that are 
considered safe when they are malicious. The ratio of false positives should be typi-
cally higher than that of false negatives to ensure a high detection rate. A stateful pro-
tocol analysis addresses the weaknesses of both signature-based and anomaly-based 
detection [7]. This analysis involves a comparison of profiles generally accepted proto-
cols against observed activities but it differs from anomaly-based detection. Unlike 
anomaly-based detection, the network profiles are vendor-provided universal profiles 
[7]. IDPS which uses this method connects to a vendor-specified server to download 
profiles which describe how protocols should behave generally in the network. Also, the 
IDPS is able to understand the state of the network, transport, and application proto-
cols [7].  
 
The stateful protocol analysis method keeps track of the sequence of commands is-
sued in the network, so that whenever a command is issued too many times or a pre-
requisite command is ignored or not issued, it could classify it as suspicious. For proto-
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cols that perform authentication, this method records the authenticator used for each 
session such as an authenticated FTP (File Transfer Protocol) connection. However, 
this IDPS analysis method has its flaws as well. Due to the fact that protocol standards 
made by standard bodies (e.g. IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) or software 
vendors can be modified by various vendors, it is almost impossible for the system to 
understand all variations of various protocols. Furthermore, vendor specific protocols 
might be challenging for the system because the details of those protocols are not of-
ten available freely to the general public. A stateful protocol analysis is also resource-
intensive due to its complexity and overheads generated while keeping track of many 
concurrent sessions. [7]  
 
In the future, considering all the detection techniques, creating a hybrid from them is 
necessary. The hybrid should combine the strengths of the techniques while minimising 
the drawbacks that will arise from its application. For any new IDPS to function prop-
erly, it should be able to minimise the overheads generated by stateful protocol analy-
sis hence the need for compression and acceleration of known protocols according to 
the frequencies of their occurrence in the network. Furthermore, there should be new 
standard bodies formed to manage vendor-specific protocols, so as to create a means 
of generalisation. When generalisation is in place, the hybrid IDPS can check for cer-
tain parameters in order to accurately detect and prevent intrusions as well as to offer 
reduced false positives. The intrusion detection system that will be covered in this re-
port is Snort. Detailed features and also some configuration procedure will be high-
lighted.  
 
Generally speaking, even though there are many types of IDPS technologies, they can 
be categorised into two: host-based and network-based detection [15]. The main differ-
ence between them is that host-based IDPS technologies focus on events on a single 
host, while network-based technologies focus on events on the network [15]. In this 
report, the focus will be on network-based technologies because the monitoring de-
vices that will be introduced later use network-based technologies. Network-based 
technologies monitor the network to detect suspicious activities whose source might be 
a host on the network or an application protocol. They are usually deployed on the bor-
ders of the network, for example in between a firewall and router. They can be set to 
intercept the network traffic, analyse it, and then either forward or drop the packet or 
they can be set in a promiscuous mode in which they only mirror the traffic passing 
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through them. Both systems where tested during this thesis project. It is recommended 
to use the interception method for more satisfactory results. 
 
3.4 Internet Bot and Malware Traffic 
 
Internet bots are also called web robots. They are often used to perform repetitive 
tasks on the Internet. A good example is automatic bidding on sites such as Ebay. 
These bids are increased when necessary by bots whose purpose is to keep increas-
ing bids each time a high bid has been offered. When monitoring network traffic, there 
are always some traffic logs that cannot be explained because they are either being 
generated by legitimate sites or malicious sites. Such traffic can be bot traffic gener-
ated by Facebook Ads and Google’s DoubleClick, which are not harmful. However, 
bots are usually exploited for malicious purposes [14]. Some can be used to gain con-
trol of a user’s computer when they are run unknowingly and some could be used for 
harvesting email addresses from forums and online guest lists. These types of bots are 
called SpamBots.  
 
Bot traffic is usually unnoticed by antivirus or endpoint because it is usually sophisti-
cated and hidden, hence the need for an IDPS system that could detect bot activities in 
the network. Once any bot traffic has been detected, it is important to sanitise the infect 
device to prevent the spread of the infection in order for it not grow into a botnet (a 
group of bot infected devices). Malware traffic refers to those generated by malware, 
either host-based or network-based malware. They are usually harmful because they 
cause harm to both their host and the network. A typical traffic generated by malware is 
a remote connection to an unknown external server. Most malware requires outbound 
connections to their masters, usually remote servers, to get new instructions and to 
transfer vital information from their infected hosts to their masters [6]. To limit this pos-
sibility it is important to shut down unused ports.  
 
3.5 Application Protocols in Granlund’s Network 
 
There are usually many protocols travelling through the network but in this thesis pro-
ject, some vendor specific protocols will be ignored, while common protocols will be 
mentioned. However, the characteristics of the individual protocols are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Granlund Oy has two functional wired and wireless networks but 
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the main focus was on the protocols being used in the LAN network. In the physical 
layer, the protocol used is Fast Ethernet at 100 Mbps, that is, the connection between 
the workstations of the users and the floor switches, as shown in figure 1. In reality, this 
speed is not achieved due to latency and host capacity. On an average, 80 Mbps is 
generally obtainable in the company. Some application protocols as observed in 
Granlund’s network include the following:  
- CIFS (Common Internet File System): used for file sharing across networks. 
- HTTP/HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol/ Hypertext Transfer Protocol Se-
cure):  used for distributed, collaborative and hypermedia information systems. 
HTTPS is secured HTTP. 
- LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol): used for maintaining distributed 
directory information services. 
- LDP (Label Distribution Protocol): MPLS label exchange protocol used by 
MPLS routers. 
- Kerberos: provides authentication for applications communicating over an un-
secured network. 
- MSRDP (Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol): used for remote connection on 
windows computers. 
- DNS (Domain Name Server): used to name Internet-connected hosts. 
- SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol): used to manage devices in a 
network. 
- SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol): used for host discovery in a net-
work. 
- DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol): used to dynamically assign ad-
dress to nodes on the network. 
- NTP (Network Time Protocol): used for time synchronisation on the network. 
Most organization prefers to use NTP to set the time on nodes on the network. 
- RSH (Remote Shell): executes shell commands on the network. 
However, the traffic of interest is the Internet traffic, so, as expected, IP (Internet Proto-
col) as well as TCP and UDP protocols were observed in the network. In the network 
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layer, IP is the protocol used on the Internet and it uses the overlying TCP and UDP 
protocols to transport IP packet in the transport layer. IPV4 is used but IPV6 traffic can 
be observed from Internet sources. In the link layer, ARP is used to resolve IP ad-
dresses into physical addresses and vice versa. ICMP is commonly used to send error 
messages and to check the status of the connected hosts on the network.  
4 Data Collection Tools 
 
Data collection tools were used to collect network data during the project. Both the 
hardware and software approach was used during the project. The hardware used was 
Bluecoat Proxy SG and Proxy AV while the software used was Snort and Colasoft 
Capsa. Although there are several commercial and open-source monitoring tools avail-
able, these tools were chosen based on the needs of the company and the goal of the 
project. The Bluecoat devices were chosen because of their caching abilities while 
Colasoft Capsa was chosen because of its user interface, which is relatively easy to 
use and also its ability to analyse network traffic at packet level and highlight possible 
network bottlenecks that should be given attention. Snort was chosen based on the fact 
that it is open-source and provides a means of comparing the performances of high-
end commercial monitoring tools such as the Bluecoat devices with a free open-source 
tool such as Snort. None of the tools is perfect as they all have their unique individual 
strengths and weaknesses. These tools can be grouped into two: performance and 
security monitoring tools. Bluecoat Proxy SG has both features when handling 
HTTP/HTTPS traffic, while the Proxy AV is an antivirus scanner that is capable of 
scanning files for malicious contents. The first tool that will be considered is Capsa, 
which is free edition. 
 
4.1 Colasoft CAPSA  
 
Colasoft Capsa (free edition) is network analyzing software that is used to decode 
packet travelling through a network. It captures network packet, groups them according 
to their protocols and analyses them in order to find bottlenecks in their operations. An 
analysis by Capsa enables network administrators to troubleshoot network perfor-
mance problems. The packet are captured in real-time and analysed accurately, so the 
network administrator can react proactively to the network performance and security 
issues detected by Capsa. The monitored port is configured in the promiscuous mode 
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so as to capture packet effectively. Capsa can be installed on a desktop or laptop and 
can be used to analyse specific network segments. Capsa is able to save network 
packet and replay them. Also, it can be configured to perform specific analysis such as 
using the filters in it for application analysis. Furthermore, just like in Bluecoat Proxy 
SG, Capsa also monitors HTTP traffic in real-time. It monitors and logs FTP (File 
Transfer Protocol), email, DNS and chat logs as well. Its GUI is designed like Mi-
crosoft’s Office 2007, thereby making it easy for administrators to find the information 
they want, and it is also customizable to suit the needs of whoever is using it. It can be 
used to plot network statistical graphs and connections between different nodes on the 
network as well as generate network vital reports when needed.[ 10] 
 
4.1.1 Features of Capsa 
 
Colasoft Capsa has many features but only those which were beneficial to the execu-
tion of the project will be highlighted here. The first of those features is extended net-
work security analysis. Capsa is able to detect multiple common attacks such as ARP 
attacks, TCP port scanning activities, and network worm activities in real-time by in-
depth packet decoding and analysis. Also, Capsa offers advanced network protocol 
analysis by giving a clear picture of all the protocols travelling through the network, 
thereby making it less challenging to spot abnormalities. Capsa is also capable of giv-
ing automatic expert network diagnosis based on the data it collects. It spots network 
problems and offers possible solutions to the bottlenecks spotted. Furthermore, it offers 
conversation analysis by depicting the numerous communications in a matrix showing 
the source and destination addresses of them all. It is also able to reconstruct packet 
stream when necessary during investigative monitoring when tracing the source of any 
alert. Capsa could be used in monitoring multiple network behavior such as HTTP, 
email, DNS, FTP, and chat applications. In addition, it offers versatile traffic and band-
width statistics on each host and individual network protocol. [10] 
 
4.1.2 Benefits of Capsa 
 
Colasoft Capsa was beneficial in various ways to both the network of Granlund and the 
project. The first benefit observed was its in-depth and comprehensive network traffic 
analysis. Capsa analysed a wide range of traffic including web traffic, LAN traffic, email 
conversations, and chat application (such as MSN) traffic. This analytic feature gave a 
17 
 
 
clear picture of the kind of traffic travelling through the network and it made the chal-
lenge of concentrating on the goal of the project easier in terms of isolation of network 
traffic segments. Also, it offered effective network communication monitoring by provid-
ing pictorial matrices of the various communications in the network. This enabled me to 
be able to trace communication paths upon receiving suspicious conversation alerts. It 
was possible to trace the source and destination as well as the kind of protocol being 
used during such conversations. [10] 
 
Furthermore, Capsa offered automatic network bottleneck diagnoses (see figure 13 for 
a list of them). These diagnoses gave an idea of the problem observed by Capsa in the 
network when analysing copies of captured network packet. Capsa also helped in net-
work security analysis by adding severity tags to observed events. Not all suspicious 
events are security-related, so by tagging these events, a network administrator can be 
able to prioritise effectively when handling alerts. Also, those events that were perform-
ance-related were also tagged accordingly. During network performance analysis, it 
was plain to see those communications that encountered performance-related prob-
lems such as slow connections. At packet level, Capsa was able to offer network pro-
tocol analysis by effectively stripping copies of network packet in order to see the kind 
of protocols being used in the network for communication whether it was internal or 
external. [10] 
 
 
4.1.3 Deployment of Capsa 
The position of the Capsa device is essential to the kind of network traffic it sees. It is 
usually positioned according to the monitoring purpose intended, either a network 
segment or the whole network. In our case, it was intended to monitor the whole net-
work, so it was deployed to monitor the LAN traffic passing through the core of the 
network to the Internet. Port mirroring (also called port spanning) when configured on 
any of the interfaces on a network switch sends a copy of the network packet passing 
through it or an entire VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) to a specified destination port 
[10]. This enables the monitoring device to strip captured copies of network packet and 
analyse them. 
Figure 2 shows the deployment of Capsa in Granlund. 
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Figure 2: Capsa Deployment in Granlund 
As shown in figure 2, the Capsa device is strategically positioned to capture outgoing 
raw data packet before they reach the firewall while the incoming packet are captured 
after passing the firewall, which gives a clear picture about the bottleneck in the net-
work. Port monitoring was configured on the switch in such a way that the source ports 
were specified while the port to which the Capsa device was connected was specified 
as the destination port. It is important to note that it is generally possible to specify mul-
tiple sources and destinations when configuring spanning on a switch. For example, 
traffic from two different source ports could be sent to a single destination port.  
Figure 3 shows an overview of the start page of Capsa. 
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Figure 3: Start page of Capsa (copied from [10]) 
As shown in figure 3, Capsa can be used to monitor the traffic passing through various 
network adapters. It can be adapted to monitor certain kinds of traffic including IM (In-
stant Messenger) traffic. Furthermore, it can be configured to only capture packet that 
match certain profiles as well as protocols using its embedded filter. The replay section 
can be used to replay stored packet when necessary. During the project, a full analysis 
was always used except in certain cases when persistent issues had to be isolated.  
Figure 4 shows an overview of main user interface. 
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Figure 4: Main user interface of Capsa (copied from [10]) 
As shown in figure 4, the “Ribbon” mark is pointing to the log output. The logs could be 
outputted to a specified directory/folder to be replayed later. The node explorer groups 
the network nodes according to their IP addresses and the WebPages visited are 
grouped according to the countries hosting them. The mid-section shows the areas of 
interest during troubleshooting, which are diagnosis and protocol. The diagnosis tab 
shows the statistics of the errors and bottlenecks found during the packet capture ses-
sion, while the protocol tab shows the statistics of the protocols observed in the net-
work. Other sections worth mentioning are the report tab and the help tab. The report 
tab shows pictorial summary of the information collected by Capsa, while the help sec-
tion contains useful information about the collected information and instructions on how 
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to use the software. Figure 5 shows an overview of the diagnosis tab. The detailed im-
plications and solutions to the network issues shown in the diagnosis tab will be dis-
cussed in chapter 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: Diagnosis Tab of Capsa. 
 
As shown in figure 5, the network issues are grouped according to the layer of the net-
work in which they occur. The four main layers where network errors occur are applica-
tion, transport, network, and link layer. The count row shows the number of times the 
errors occur during the data collection. Figure 6 is an overview of the protocol tab. It 
shows the type of protocols observed in the network.  
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Figure 6: Protocols detected by Capsa 
As shown in figure 6, the protocols are all Ethernet protocols, mostly IP. They are fur-
ther grouped into TCP, UDP and ICMP. Also, a group was created for ARP and IPV6 
observed traffic. 
 
4.2 Snort 
 
Snort was created by Martin Roesch in 1998 but it is now developed by SourceFire 
(Martin Roesch is the founder of SourceFire) [11]. Snort is an open-source network-
based intrusion detection tool with the capacity to capture real-time network traffic and 
packet logging on an IP network. Snort uses a set of rules to combine some of the 
benefits of signature, protocol, and anomaly-based inspection methods to achieve in-
trusion detection. Snort can be used in a network for protocol analysis and content 
searching/matching [11]. It could also be used to detect probes or attacks such as port 
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scans, OS (operating system) fingerprinting, buffer overflows, and SMB (Server Mes-
sage Block) probes. Snort can be configured in three modes: sniffer mode, packet log-
ger mode, and intrusion detection mode [11]. In the sniffer mode, Snort simply promis-
cuously collects and displays network packet, while in the packet logger mode, it col-
lects the packet and logs them into a database or the hard disk of its host. In the intru-
sion detection mode, it collects network packet and analyses them using a pre-defined 
set of rules, in order to decide on how the packet should be handled (whether to drop 
and log, allow and log, or simply generate an alert).  
 
During the project, Snort was configured in the hybrid mode, that is, in both the packet 
logger and the intrusion detection mode [11]. The packet logger used was Syslog 
Watcher, which is a freeware used for logging system data. The rulesets used were 
downloaded from www.Snort.org. The Snort ruleset can be downloaded only as either 
a subscriber or a registered user. Registered users get the privilege of getting the 
rulesets a month before the subscribers but, while the registered subscription is a paid 
version, the general subscription is free. It is also possible to use self-written rules in 
Snort. This feature brings flexibility and adaptability to the use of Snort especially in an 
enterprise environment where too many false positives are obtainable and the need for 
fine-tuning is ever present. However, Snort does not clean up infected hosts when de-
tected but creates an alert for that particular incident. Most network worms and Trojans 
operate by scanning the network from infected hosts to find other hosts with exploitable 
vulnerabilities. These scans usually generate packet in the network which Snort can 
analyse to detect suspicious activities. This analysis can create false-positives because 
legitimate scanning from maybe a software license key scanner might be reported as 
suspicious, hence the need for tailoring self-written or common rules to suit the network 
environment. One way to achieve this in Snort is to set the appropriate threshold. The 
configuration file called “threshold.conf” file could be modified for this purpose. 
 
4.2.1 Features of Snort 
 
The first feature of Snort worth mentioning in relation to the project is the fact that it is 
open source. Its open-source nature and widespread use are some of the reasons why 
it was chosen for the project. Also, it is an IDPS that could be used in different modes 
either host-based or network-based. However, it was used as a network-based IDPS 
during the project. Using syslog or a simple text file, Snort is able to alert/log observed 
threats in real-time. The alerts are generated with the help of its detection engine which 
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is able to detect different types of attacks. It matches the observed traffic patterns with 
the rules in the engine, so as to detect intrusions. Snort could be run on different OS 
platforms even though its native OS is Linux. The programming language used in 
Snort’s detection engine is a simple language that describes per action tests and ac-
tions. It is easy to use and it makes the detection of new threats faster. [19] 
 
4.2.2    Benefits of Snort 
 
Snort is relatively inexpensive because the software is open source and it could be 
installed on off-the-shelf workstations. Most commercial IDS require expensive dedi-
cated hardware while the use of Snort does not require any. In addition, Snort opera-
tions are fast. Snort can be installed on multiple workstations and placed in strategic 
places in order to effectively monitor network segments. Also, it could be used to moni-
tor multiple locations from one physical location (just like it was set up during the pro-
ject). Furthermore, Snort rules are easy to write because they do not involve the use of 
any complex programming language. [19] 
 
4.2.3 Deployment of Snort Sensor 
 
Snort sensor (the workstation on which it was installed) was deployed in a way similar 
to Capsa as shown in figure 2. However, the hardware and software requirement for 
Snort is slightly different from that of Capsa due to the fact that Snort can be configured 
to make decisions based on pre-installed rulesets. This decision-making feature will 
function optimally when the hardware has moderate specifications (the higher the spec-
ification, the faster the packet processing will be). During the project, a dedicated work-
station was used for packet capturing. It only received copies of the packet travelling 
through the network, analysed the packet, and created alerts when suspicious activities 
were found. It was not configured to make any decision. The Snort sensor had the fol-
lowing specifications: 
 
- Windows 7 64-bit Operating system (OS) 
- Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q9300 @2.50 GHz 
- 6 GB RAM. 
Snort is open-source so it should be used on an open-source OS such as Ubuntu but 
there is a way to install it on Windows as well. In order for it to be installed on Windows, 
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some required software components for its functionality should be installed first. This 
software includes: 
- Antivirus software (Microsoft Security Essential)  
- Firewall software (Comodo Firewall)  
- Microsoft Baseline Security Analyser  
- ActivePerl 5.10.1.1007 (higher versions were not compatible) 
- Notepad++ 
- PDF reader (Adobe Reader)  
- Syslog Watcher 4  
- 7-Zip  
- WinPcap  
- Snort 2.9.3.1  
- Oinkmaster. [17] 
All this software is freeware. The antivirus and firewall listed are different from those 
used during the project (Symantec Endpoint and Juniper firewall were used). The de-
tailed procedure of the installation is beyond the scope of this report. However, the in-
stallation guidelines can be found online [18]. Snort shows certain details on the CLI 
(command line interface). Figure 7 shows the statistics of the packet analysed by the 
sensor.  
 
Figure 7: Snort packet statistics 
 
As shown in figure 7, the time taken for the packet to be analysed was recorded which 
was approximately 20.5 hours during one test session. Furthermore, the packet flow 
statistics was also recorded in pkts/hr, pkts/min, or pkts/sec. The sensor succeeded in 
analyzing the received packet with an efficiency of over 99% due to the fact that only 
0.593% was dropped without analysis. Figure 8 shows the protocols observed in the 
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packet collected. Our monitoring was focused on the LAN so Ethernet protocols were 
detected as expected. 
 
Figure 8: Protocols observed in the network. 
 
In figure 8, it can be observed that 100% Ethernet traffic was observed as expected. 
One statistic of interest is Eth Loop (0.003%). These are error broadcast/multicast 
packet sent as a result of a few possible reasons. It might have resulted from spanning 
tree errors on a particular switch or excessive multipath-packet-delivery in the network. 
Further details and solutions will be given in the next chapter. The sum of the packet of 
other protocols (such as IPV4, ICMP, UDP, TCP, IPV6, and Frag) is equal to the num-
ber of Eth packet which is equal to the total number of packet captured.  
In figure 9, the statistics of action taken on the analysed packet are shown. The Snort 
sensor was configured in the sniffer mode (to analysed copies of mirrored packet), so 
no negative action was expected to be taken on the captured packet.  
 
Figure 9: Action statistics of captured packet 
 
As shown in figure 9, the entire packets captured were allowed although it is possible 
to configure the sensor to take other actions. The alert log created gives a more de-
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tailed view of the suspicious packet captured. Usually in modes other than the  sniffer 
mode, the Snort sensor blocks this type of traffic. Snort uses preprocessors through 
which captured packet are scanned before they are sent to the detection engine. These 
preprocessors and the detection engine trigger rules according to the protocols they 
handle. Typically, each protocol has its preprocessor. Some of the widely used prepro-
cessors are HTTP, FTP, GTP (GPRS Tunneling Protocol), SMTP, SIP (Session Initia-
tion Protocol), DCERPC2, Stream5, and Frag3 preprocessors. Preprocessors operate 
in the same way as plug-ins, so they can either be turned on or off according to the 
needs of the network administrator.  
 
During the project, HTTP traffic was ignored (until the later stages) in Snort because 
Bluecoat was the dedicated device monitoring web traffic (details on Bluecoat are given 
in sections 4.3 and 4.4). The detection engine serves as the decision-making room. It 
receives data from the preprocessors, checks them through a set of rules, and creates 
an alert or drops the packet if necessary. It is important to note that attacks can be di-
rected at the Snort sensor so high security practice is advised when setting up the sen-
sor. One of those security measures will be installing regular patches to the system 
when available. Also, the sensor should have two network interfaces (NIC). One of the 
interfaces will be assigned an IP address and it will be used as the management inter-
face for remote connection (a private IP address will be most preferred) while the other 
will be without any IP configuration because it will be used for packet collection.  
 
4.3 Bluecoat ProxySG 
 
Bluecoat ProxySG appliances are part of the family of Bluecoat security solutions. The 
ProxySG provides a platform for secure web communications and application accelera-
tion. The web security is provided in the form of web filtering while the acceleration is 
done via its caching ability. ProxySG can be used to implement flexible, granular, policy 
control over content, users, and applications [8]. The ProxySG editions used during the 
project were two stacked ProxySG 600-10. Each of them was licensed to handle 500 
concurrent users, a 250 GB SATA disk drive, and 4 GB RAM. Furthermore, each de-
vice had two 1000Base-T NICs. One of the NICs was used for management while the 
other was used as a bypass port. A bypass port provides a failover access port for an 
in-line monitoring device such as the ProxySG [8]. Since two ProxySGs were used, 
proper load balancing had to be configured. As mentioned in section 2, Granlund has 
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three floors, so the traffic from the floors was divided between the two ProxySGs. How-
ever, the first ProxySG had the highest amount of web traffic directed towards it. [8] 
 
4.3.1    Features of ProxySG 
 
In view of Granlund’s network needs, the ProxySG offers some exciting features that 
made the execution of the project hitch-free. One of those features is complete web 
protection through web filtering, deep inspection of contents, inspection and validation 
of SSL traffic, content caching and traffic optimization, bandwidth management, 
streaming media control, and applications protocols control in order to prevent data 
loss and to drastically suppress web threats. Web protection is the main feature used in 
Granlund, so as to ensure the security of the users when accessing web contents. This 
is due to the autonomy given to each user as regards the use of their workstations. 
Furthermore, the applications are control or powered by the application policy engine of 
the device, which made it possible to allow selective web applications access via 
Granlund’s network. This was to ensure web security and in some cases, eliminate 
online distractions that could reduce work-related productivity of the employees. 
 
The ProxySG offered high performance and reliability due to its multiple processing 
cores, lightweight customized OS, called SGOS, which rarely needs patching, and the 
failover feature turned on in the stack to guarantee service delivery in case of a device 
failure. In case of a device failure, the traffic is automatically routed via the second 
functioning device. The devices are also equipped with device monitors such as fan 
rotation and CPU usage monitors which help administrators monitor the health of the 
devices. Another feature tested during the project was Bluecoat ProxyClient which 
could be installed on non-stationary devices such as laptops, to ensure that the same 
web policy used in Granlund’s LAN was used whenever the user connected to the In-
ternet using the devices of the company. This feature ensured remote web security and 
the implementation of uniform security policy for both LAN and remote users. [8] 
  
4.3.2    Benefits of ProxySG 
 
The proxy provided protection to both the hosts and the network from web threats, 
phishing, and other attacks by filtering the traffic entering the network. This web filtering 
ability made it possible to enforce Granlund’s web access policies in the network by 
preventing access to certain web categories, such as pornography, that are not allowed 
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or are not considered to be work-related. Also, its caching ability reduces bandwidth 
consumption by serving cached copies whenever the same page is requested. This 
speedy delivery of cached copies can be considered an improvement to general net-
work performance. The proxy does not only support HTTP/HTTPS traffic, but it also 
supports other protocols such as FTP, RTMP (Real-time Messaging Protocol), RTSP 
(Real-time Streaming Protocol), DNS, Telnet, and streaming media protocols. [8] 
 
4.3.3    Deployment of ProxySG 
 
The deployment of ProxySG is similar to that of Capsa and it is exactly the same as the 
deployment of ProxyAV which will be discussed in section 4.4.3. The main highlight of 
the deployment is the policy-based routing, which means routing network traffic based 
on firewall policies. The firewall was configured to forward traffic from certain network 
addresses to the proxy and the proxy checks the traffic before allowing, warning, or 
blocking it from accessing the network. For example, the firewall does not block traffic 
to sites with explicit contents but it forwards web traffic to the proxy. The proxy oper-
ates based on its own set of rules which it uses to determine what action to take, con-
cerning requests for explicit web contents. The preconfigured action on the proxy for 
such contents is to block them according to Granlund’s web policy, so the access is 
denied and the user is notified about it. The proxy is deployed right next to the firewall. 
 
Figure 10 shows the deployment of ProxySG in Granlund’s network environment. 
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Figure 10: Deployment of Bluecoat ProxySG.  
 
As shown in figure 10, the proxy is positioned next to the firewall and the traffic is di-
rected from the firewall to the proxy via policy-based routing. Exceptions can be creat-
ed to bypass the proxy when necessary because there is direct route from the firewall 
to the Internet. Even though it is not depicted in figure 10, the ProxySG is a stack of 
two proxies, which makes it possible to load-balance the network traffic to ensure fast 
web responses.  
 
 
 
4.3.4   Overview of ProxySG’s GUI 
 
Figure 11 shows an overview of the GUI (graphic user interface) of ProxySG’s man-
agement console.  
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Figure 11: GUI of ProxySG’s Management Console. 
 
As shown in figure 11, ProxySG’s GUI is divided into sections. The model and serial 
number as well as the OS version can be clearly seen while in the far right hand cor-
ner, the support and documentation tab can be seen. The documentation tab contains 
information about each section, which enables users to get an explanation about the 
specific section in which they are exploring. This feature helps to prevent the study of 
voluminous manuals. On the left hand side, the possible configurable sections of the 
proxy can be seen. Under the policy section, the visual policy manager (VPM) manag-
es policy creation and implementation. The ProxyClient section handles the deploy-
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ment and configuration of the ProxyClient. The content filtering section controls the 
web access. 
 
There are options as regards the filter to use during web filtering. Internet Watch Foun-
dation (IWF) and Bluecoat webfilter are commonly used, but during the project, Blue-
coat webfilter was the used. The webfilter contains different categories (such as ex-
treme, sports or news) and these categories can be either blocked, allowed, or can 
warn the user when accessing certain web categories. In the diagnostic section, it is 
possible to check the categories of any website whose category appears unknown (this 
is often the case with local sites). It is also possible to submit a website to Bluecoat to 
be reassessed if it has been wrongly categorized. The external section is configured to 
connect the ProxySG with the ProxyAV for virus or malware scanning of Internet con-
tents (more details will be given later in section 4.4).  The scanning process is referred 
to as ICAP (Internet Content Adaptation Protocol) scanning. In the maintenance sec-
tion, the license and health of the proxy device can be monitored. Furthermore, it is 
also possible to carry out a software upgrade when available. The easiest way to know 
how healthy the device is, is to check the color of the “OK” mark in the far-right-hand 
corner of the GUI (green color signifies healthiness while red signifies faultiness). [8] 
 
4.4 Bluecoat ProxyAV 
 
ProxyAV offers advanced malware detection at the gateway level of the network. Traf-
fic routed towards the proxy devices by the firewall are scanned by the ProxyAV before 
being delivered to the user. The malware scanning feature is configured alongside the 
ProxySG. In the ProxySG configuration, when ICAP scanning is enabled, the IP ad-
dress of the ProxyAV is added as the antivirus/antimalware engine to be used for 
scanning Internet contents before being delivered to the user. For example, when a 
user tries to download files from the Internet, these files are first scanned by the 
ProxyAV before sending them to the user via the ProxySG. This type of protection is 
known as Inline threat protection. Usually, ProxyAV and ProxySG are deployed togeth-
er in the same network environment for maximum protection and unrivaled perfor-
mance. These combinations provide Internet security to the user and acts as an added 
security layer in a case whereby the user uses antivirus software. The ProxyAV hard-
ware is similar to that of the ProxySG. It is equipped with a quad core CPU, 500 GB 
SATA disk drive, 3 GB RAM, and two 1000 Base-T NICs which serves the same pur-
pose as those in the ProxySG. [9] 
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4.4.1    Features of ProxyAV 
 
ProxyAV was used in carrying out inline threat analysis using Kaspersky engine as its 
malware engine. This inline threat analysis prevents web threats from entering into the 
network. Also, it was used in scanning downloaded Internet files before they are deliv-
ered to the user. When an infected file is observed, it is discarded and the download 
process will be interrupted, so as to ensure the overall security of the network. It also 
has a high performance processor and it is scalable, that is, it could be stacked as the 
network grows. Furthermore, it has a deferred scanning mechanism which enables it to 
intelligently avoid the scanning of media contents such as live streams (both audio and 
video) and video-on-demand. [9] 
 
4.4.2    Benefits of ProxyAV 
 
When used together with ProxySG, ProxyAV offers both high performance and security 
effectively. It scans files entering into the network thoroughly in order to detect infected 
files and block them from being delivered to the user. Infected files are often executa-
ble and there are sources which are largely reported as unknown, so whenever a pub-
lisher cannot be verified at the proxy level, it is blocked from getting to the user. This 
blocking effect provides an added security to the network hosts in cases where the 
antivirus software of the host is either missing or not function properly. Selective scan-
ning can be configured on the proxy. ProxyAV was configured to avoid scanning files 
larger than 500 MB, so as to avoid unnecessary device resource consumption due to 
the fact that CAD files, which are usually large, are often sent to and from Granlund’s 
network. Furthermore, a safe list containing websites with large downloadable file often 
visited in the company was created, to avoid the files from being scanned by the proxy.  
However, large files leaving the network are not scanned even though the proxy could 
be used to scan both incoming and outgoing traffic. The proxy’s malware definition is 
updated automatically and frequently, so as to provide zero-day attacks. [9] 
 
4.4.3    Deployment of ProxyAV 
 
The deployment of ProxyAv is the same as that of ProxySG. For curious security en-
thusiasts, it is worthwhile mentioning that there is a free version of Kaspersky malware 
scanning engine called K9 Web Protection which can be used to implement web con-
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tent filtering and parental control. This web filter is the same as Bluecoat webfilter. It 
could be installed on computers and mobile phones (including iOS and Android devic-
es). 
 
4.4.4    Overview of ProxyAV’s GUI 
 
Figure 12 shows an overview of the ProxyAV’s management console GUI.  
 
Figure 12: GUI of ProxyAV Management console.  
 
As shown in figure 12, the protocol used is ICAP (Internet Content Adaptation Proto-
col), which is a lightweight protocol similar to HTTP, used proxy servers in order to im-
plement virus or malware scanning and content filtering in proxy caches. The health 
status and the help section (named documentation section in ProxySG) are similar to 
those in the GUI of ProxySG. The number of viruses caught is 12 out of 8565485 files 
scanned. In the antivirus section, the scanning behavior of the proxy can be configured. 
Also, the files are logged, to enable network administrators to troubleshoot network 
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issues when necessary. In order to get well designed graphical reports from Bluecoat 
proxies, software called Bluecoat Reporter was used. It is log processing software that 
receives log files via FTP transfer, processes them and displays statistical results 
graphically. 
 
Figure 13 shows an overview of the GUI of Bluecoat Reporter. 
 
Figure 13: GUI of Bluecoat Reporter. 
 
As shown in figure 13, the possible reports are grouped into categories. The main cat-
egories of interest are user behavior and security because it is important to know the 
general habits of the users and the security threats that follow in order to make policies 
that will ensure network safety. The dashboard section shows the graphical representa-
tion of the listed categories while the video usage section shows the bandwidth usage 
on media streams in the network. One main concern of most enterprises is the band-
width usage. It is necessary for acquired bandwidth to be used for work-related pur-
poses, hence the need to monitor its usage periodically. However, according to the 
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privacy law in Finland, the amount of information gathered on individual browsing hab-
its is limited, so as to give the users the necessary privacy they need when browsing. 
Detailed drills are only necessary in some cases such as suspected espionage or trou-
bleshooting bottlenecks. This privacy law was adhered to during this project. Chapter 5 
explains the results of the project and solutions to network bottlenecks encountered. 
 
5 Data Collected and Analyses of the Results 
 
5.1 Data Collected by Capsa and Analyses of the Results 
 
As mentioned in section 4.1, Colasoft Capsa (free edition) is a network analyzing soft-
ware that is used to decode packet travelling through a network. Having set up Capsa 
as described in section 4.1, the main focus was to identify and correct the bottlenecks 
observed in the network. The bottlenecks were grouped according to the OSI layer in 
which they occur. Some were in the application layer, transport layer, network layer 
and data link layer. Figure 13 shows an overview of the number of errors diagnosed 
during the packet capturing by Capsa. In general, no severe errors were observed. 
Nevertheless, there were many error packet travelling through the network. The total 
number of packet captured was approximately 1.1 billion packet. 
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Figure 14: Errors observed by Capsa. 
 
In the application layer, bottlenecks relating to DNS, SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Pro-
tocol), FTP, and HTTP were observed but for the sake fluidity in the report, HTTP secu-
rity issues will be covered in section 5.2, under Bluecoat while the performance issues 
will be explained in this section. In the transport layer, TCP retransmission packet ac-
count for over 50% of the error packet. TCP is a connection-oriented protocol which 
guarantees packet delivery during transmission by usually resending damaged packet 
when acknowledgement (ACK) packet are lost. This unique feature of TCP prompted 
several retransmissions in the network because it is common for Internet packet to be 
damaged, lost or delayed during transmission due to differences in the capacity of the 
sending host and the path through which they are sent. 
 
In the application layer, there were over a million error packet logged. The FTP error-
alerts are also false positives because although large numbers of files were sent via 
FTP to a remote server, the entire files transferred were from the Bluecoat device to 
the server hosting the Bluecoat reporter software. These log files are often very large 
and could trigger false alert just as reported in Capsa. The HTTP performance errors 
are those related with slow server response, server returned error, and the request 
page not found. These error messages were normal alerts that should exist in a net-
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work like Granlund’s where there are many simultaneous connections to the Internet. 
Not all web servers on the Internet are fast and not all of them are geographically close 
to users. It is normal to get a slow server response when accessing sites that usually 
experience heavy traffic (such as Facebook and Google) or even local sites that are 
hosted on slow host servers.  
 
Considering the number of packet in the network, the HTTP alerts were not alarming 
because quite many sites use HTTP cookies which store users browsing data so as to 
enable faster information delivery the next time the user visits that particular site. In 
Granlund, the ProxySG is used as a cache which speeds up the delivery of often visit-
ed sites. The ProxySG serves as a proxy server that facilitates access to web contents 
by serving as an intermediary between users and the web resource they are accessing. 
Some web contents should not be cached such as news and media streaming sites 
because they are dynamic (changing often) in nature. Not all Internet pages are acces-
sible, so the requested page not found alert was normal as well.  
 
The inaccessible pages might have been blocked or were offline. Lastly, with regards 
to the application layer errors, DNS errors were also observed. Some of the DNS errors 
were performance-related, while others were faults. In Granlund, an internal DNS serv-
er behind the firewall is used. Internal DNS servers use private addresses while exter-
nal DNS servers use public address – Google has a public DNS service that is free (IP 
addresses 8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4). The solution to the slow response DNS server alerts 
was to check the physical link to make sure it was not overloaded while the other two 
alerts were insignificant because they were considered normal, considering the total 
volume of packet travelling through the network and the individual habits of users. 
Some users might have too many active windows opened on their PC, which carry out 
automatic updates of their contents without the interaction of the users.  
 
In the transport layer, which is the layer with the most error packet, the total number of 
error packet captured was around 42.8 million packet. The most prominent error rec-
orded was TCP retransmission. It is important to note that retransmission errors are not 
security related; instead, they are performance-related. Most of the errors were gener-
ated during Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) update and DNS response. SEP is 
hosted on a dedicated server which distributes security policy updates to its remote 
clients so it is not unusual to find out that during packet transmission, retransmission 
was required considering the behavior of TCP which guarantees packet delivery. Some 
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workstations also reported many TCP retransmissions, and when checked, it was dis-
covered that some of the workstations had too many active programs (such as Skype 
and iTunes update service) that were in frequent connection with remote servers, 
which occupied the network making it slow.  
 
A slow network path is also the major cause of other TCP errors such as duplicate 
acknowledgement, connection retry, and connection refused. Slow network path signi-
fies congestion on the network or the transmission port being used by the sending and 
the receiving hosts or server. It is easier to troubleshoot a slow workstation or server 
than a whole network, so before checking the network devices for bottlenecks, the end-
hosts were checked first. Workstations could be sped up by reducing the number of 
concurrent services and programs running in them, thereby freeing CPU resources for 
a quick response when necessary. It is necessary to point out that the workstations in 
Granlund’s network are equipped with Gigabit Ethernet NICs, so it is difficult for the 
interface to be overwhelmed by the network traffic. However, the network link between 
the hosts and the destination might be affected.  
 
The illegal TCP checksum errors were not many, only 19, and most of them were from 
a particular server, so it was checked to see if it was performing hardware TCP offload 
checksum. Hardware could be used to automatically compute the checksum of network 
packet in the network adapter before transmission to the network or reception from the 
network for validation. This checksum offload can generally increase network perfor-
mance by saving CPU cycles from calculating the checksum. This hardware checksum 
offload is often reported as illegal by most packet analysers. TCP port scans were car-
ried out by domain controllers and servers, such as Exchange and Spiceworks servers, 
but some workstations were also reported to have done this. The TCP port scan is a 
way of checking which ports are open on a host in order to initiate a TCP three-way 
handshake. This should not be done by unauthorized workstations unless they are act-
ing as servers for some software services. The workstations reported were thoroughly 
scanned for malicious software applications. TCP scanning often triggers alerts in mon-
itoring and IDS devices.  
 
In the network layer, the network error messages are centered on IP and ICMP. High 
error packet in this layer usually signifies wrong network configuration and poor net-
work health but it fortunately had the least number of errors. The IP TTL (Time To Live) 
too low error was a false positive when checked, because it is different for different 
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operating systems. The affected systems were pinged and the TTL values returned 
were as expected. TTL is the value used to make sure a packet does not travel through 
the network in an endless loop, thereby creating unwanted traffic in the network. The 
TTL value of Windows, Linux, and Cisco operating systems are 128, 64, and 256 re-
spectively. Capsa recorded errors because it was designed for Windows systems and 
treated all other TTL values as errors. An IP address conflict was reported as one of 
the errors but the report was false because Capsa reported Ethernet broadcast MAC 
addresses (FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF) as conflicting addresses. An Ethernet broadcast is 
used by ARP to translate IP addresses to MAC addresses so in a DHCP-enabled net-
work. It is normal to get quite a few of them periodically.  
 
ICMP errors account for the errors got when one host tries unsuccessfully to ping an-
other host. In Granlund, due to the use of the firewall, not all devices can be pinged. 
Most of the errors reported were those unsuccessful ping trials targeted at the Bluecoat 
ProxySG. This was functioning as it should because only the workstations of the ad-
ministrators were configured to access that network. Also, some servers did not accept 
ICMP requests due to the firewall setting. This practice helps to prevent ICMP attacks if 
ever they should occur, so it is necessary to put a certain server and proxy devices on 
a separate network beyond the reach of other standard hosts in the network. ICMP 
host unreachable error messages were also generated when the target host was may-
be offline.  
 
In the data link layer, the protocol in use is ARP. The error messages generated were 
false because the ARP requests logged were Ethernet broadcast messages which are 
not harmful to the network but necessary to successfully map MAC addresses to their 
respective IP addresses. To ensure that there was no illegal ARP scan request in the 
network, the source had to be verified, and to avoid storms in the network, storm-
control was enabled on the switches. Storm-control is a command in Cisco IOS that 
could be used to control the amount of ARP request/received on a particular interface. 
The gateways of the network handle quite many ARP requests, so it is important to use 
network equipment with high capacity ports so as not to introduce unwanted lags in the 
network.  
 
To summarise, Capsa was able to highlight and group the problems and bottlenecks 
discovered according to the various layers in which they occurred from top to bottom. 
As observed in the diagnosis section of Capsa, the application layer reported DNS, 
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SMTP, FTP, and HTTP network problems while the transport layer contained TCP-
related problems. Furthermore, the network layer highlighted problems related to both 
IP and ICMP, while at the data link layer reported ARP-related issues.  
 
5.2 Data Collected by Bluecoat and Analyses of the Results 
 
In this section, the results analysed will not be separated into ProxySG and ProxyAV 
because both devices worked together to provide maximum web security and their logs 
were analysed by the reporter software. HTTP traffic was directed by the firewall to the 
Bluecoat devices and the ProxySG was configured to carry out ICAP scanning on the 
traffic it received using the ProxyAV engine. The inline scanning enables Bluecoat to 
provide adequate security against web threats even when they are hidden in non-
suspicious Internet traffic. ProxySG operates by either blocking or allowing certain rules 
according to the network configuration via the VPM (Visual Policy Manager). These 
rules were grouped into different user-defined layers. Figure 14 shows an overview of 
the various layers configured in ProxySG.  
 
 
Figure 15: ProxySG’s VPM GUI. 
 
As shown in figure 14, there were eight defined layers but all controlling users’ web 
access. The sections that are often edited are the destination and action section. The 
destination specifies where the traffic is heading, while the action specifies what verdict 
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to give to such traffic. The SSL rules are those that specify how to treat secure web 
connections while the “web content layer no-ICAP” rule fine tunes the “web access 
layer” rule in such a way that it allows some web requests from certain sites (such as 
Adobe and Microsoft) to bypass the ProxyAV in order not to scan their contents. This 
feature saves proxy resources because those requests are not harmful and do not re-
quire scanning. The “web access bandwidth” rule allows administrators to limit the 
bandwidth consumptions of certain sites (such as YouTube). These websites consume 
a lot of bandwidth and are often visited by network users The “web content layer don’t 
cache” instructs the proxy to not cache sites (such as news/media) that require fre-
quent updates. The “web access layer” contained web categories that could be blocked 
or allowed and these categories were defined in the web filter. Bluecoat web filter cate-
gorizes billions of web pages into 85 categories in over 50 languages. 
 
The webfilter is powered by over 75 million users in the WebPulse collaborative de-
fense. Uncategorized, new, or unknown sites could be sent online to WebPulse for 
analysis and categorization. Also, wrongly categorized sites (especially local sites) 
could be sent for re-evaluation. The webfilter database was updated frequently and 
automatically. From the reporter, detailed statistics of the network usage could be 
seen. The reports show the bandwidth usage, most visited websites, browsing time of 
certain websites, web applications used, potential threats, and the protocols requested. 
The reports were grouped into large groups: user behavior, security, and bandwidth 
usage, and video usage reports among others. Some reports that directly relate to this 
thesis will be discussed here. The potential threats report shows the number of mali-
cious threats that were intercepted by the proxies. The threats detected by the 
ProxyAV were fewer compared to those detected by the ProxySG, showing that harm-
ful web attacks are more sophisticated and smaller in size when compared to a few 
years ago.  
 
The ProxyAV detected threats in files that were downloaded from the Internet and were 
about 500 MB in size. However, larger files were not scanned because these files were 
downloaded from trusted sources. The ProxyAV interrupts downloads of large files and 
asks the user to contact the administrator. The administrator checks the legitimacy of 
the site before adding it to the “web content layer no_ICAP” group, so as to bypass the 
proxy during subsequent downloads. From the “trend of potential threats” report, it 
could be seen that the days with the highest number of web threats are Mondays and 
Fridays. Also, the number of threats prevented increased after blocking certain catego-
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ries such as web advertisement, non-viewable content, and tv/video streams. These 
categories are the ones that are normally found when viewing some legitimate sites. 
They establish their own connections without the consent of users, thereby consuming 
network resources.  
 
ProxyAV detected some malware and the list of those malware can be found in the 
“ProxyAV malware detected names” section of the reporter. Only three instances of 
malware activities was detected, and they are Trojans: HEUR:Trojan.Script.iframer and 
HEUR:Trojan.Script.Generic. Although these threats were prevented, they were logged 
and the affected client’s IP could be seen when assessing the log details. The two cli-
ents involved were scanned with SEP to make sure that the infection attempt was un-
successful as reported. Web advertisements are a common way of infecting hosts con-
nected to the Internet. In terms of user behavior reports, the bandwidth consumption 
was the main interest. Slow network connections can arise from inappropriate use of 
the network bandwidth. Over a period of two weeks, Youtube was the most bandwidth 
intensive web application used for video streams. Not all streams are unproductive 
because some are used for training purposes, which adds value to the company. 
 
Slow network connections can arise from too many active video streams, hence the 
need to prioritize network protocol request. The speed of video streams was limited to 
10 Mb/s, so as to avoid congestion and HTTP requests were given the most priority so 
as not to disrupt other activities in the network. In this era of social media, there were 
typically more requests to social sites than there were to streaming sites but in terms of 
the network resources consumed, the streaming sites were (as expected) more re-
source consuming (over 1500 times more than that required for social media requests). 
Network bandwidth loss was also limited by blocking access to web advertisements, 
non-viewable contents, large software downloads, and malicious sources.  
 
 
5.3 Data Collected by Snort and Analyses of the Results 
 
Snort is the IDPS setup during the project to monitor network packet for suspicious 
intrusive behavior. Snort was discovered to be full of false positives. After analysing the 
packet, the alerts were discovered to be false positives due to a few explainable rea-
sons. The main reason was the position of the Snort sensor in the network. Snort sen-
sors should be placed in the DMZ of the network so as to enable it to detect intrusion 
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attempts and bad network traffic. Another reason was that the traffic from the proxy 
(Bluecoat) and the virtual servers were not regular Windows traffic. Vendor-specific 
traffic triggered false alerts which Snort reported. Traffic between the proxies is usually 
encrypted just like those between servers. However, it is good that this traffic anomaly 
was noticed by Snort. In order to reduce this false alert, a network segment exception 
could be added to the Snort configuration but this is not advisable because some 
events might be missed. False alerts were also created when SNMP traffic was detect-
ed.  
 
Examples of these alerts can be found below (bold markings are safe network ad-
dresses): 
 
 
 
- Proxy traffic false positive: 
[**] [120:1:1] (http_inspect) ANOMALOUS HTTP SERVER ON UNDEFINED HTTP 
PORT [**] 
[Classification: Unknown Traffic] [Priority: 3]  
12/05-15:00:20.880621 00:D0:83:07:1C:CD -> 00:8C:FA:05:79:44 type:0x800 
len:0x172 
10.50.0.4:61637 -> 10.50.0.3:1344 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7359 IpLen:20 
DgmLen:356 
***AP*** Seq: 0x700E1760  Ack: 0x1019F8F0  Win: 0xFFFF  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 3143564216 79741442 
 
- SNMP false positive: 
[**] [1:1411:16] SNMP public access udp [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2]  
12/05-15:00:27.993660 00:27:0C:98:B0:46 -> 00:26:73:0A:1B:1C type:0x800 len:0x79 
172.20.0.45:1042 -> 172.20.3.244:161 UDP TTL:127 TOS:0x0 ID:265 IpLen:20 
DgmLen:107 Len: 79 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/data/downloads/allitems.html2002-0013][Xref => 
http://cve.mitre.org/data/downloads/allitems.html2002-0012][Xref => 
http://cve.mitre.org/data/downloads/allitems.html1999-0517][Xref => 
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http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/4089][Xref => 
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/4088][Xref => http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2112 
 
SNMP traffic was generated by requests directed at the network printers and was not 
harmful.   
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6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the project was successful. The intended traffic monitoring process was 
carried out successfully, albeit it was more challenging than expected, due to the large 
volumes of traffic logs that were analysed, and the acquisition, setup and configuration 
of the tools used during the project. The goal of the project was to carry out Internet 
traffic monitoring using the network of Granlund Oy as a case study. The main task 
was to monitor the traffic logs generated to find anomalies, locate its source, and to 
verify the veracity of any alert by checking the affected device. In most cases, a gen-
eral malware scan (using SEP) was enough to remove any malware found. In cases 
where slow connections were reported, the host was checked to see which process 
was using up its resources and then the network connection (host – switch) was 
checked to make sure that the speed and duplex of the connection was at its maxi-
mum.  
 
During the project, the process of monitoring the Internet traffic of an enterprise net-
work was analysed by first choosing the right tools to use from the pool of available 
tools and then proceeding to set them up and to configure them to suit the intended 
purpose. The most challenging part of the setup process was the Snort sensor be-
cause it involved tuning the software made originally for open-source operating sys-
tems to suit a network with primarily Microsoft Windows devices. It involved the installa-
tion of some prerequisite software, which would enable the desired software function 
properly. Also, checking each rule and adding new rules (where necessary) was found 
to be technically challenging but worth trying out. At the network packet analysis level, 
Capsa was effective in capturing most packets and analyzing them to find out where 
bottlenecks might exist in the network during transmissions. However, Capsa would be 
more effective when configured to monitor specific network segments as opposed to 
the whole network due to its ability to generate false alerts.  
 
Future studies could be carried out on using Snort in the host-based monitoring mode 
and to check its monitoring efficiency when placed in various segments of the same 
network. Furthermore, more alternative tools such as Nessus could be tried out in fu-
ture projects. Other possible uses of the Bluecoat devices mentioned in the thesis 
could also be studied.   
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